Hitch as a Teachable Moment

Usually, British cultural gossip is far more interesting than ours. One example is the recent controversy about whether popular cinema has a place in regular schools’ curricula. As British Film Institute’s creative director Heather Stewart recently commented, “The idea of popular cinema somehow being capable of great art at the same time as being entertaining is still a problem for some people. Shakespeare is on the national curriculum, Hitchcock is not.” No surprise that so many people tend to react with suspicion whenever their child comes back from school commenting something about “the movie Mr. X showed us today in class.” What a waste of time! is the flashing thought that crisscrosses our parental minds right away.

I certainly disagree though. Aside from the Benjaminian implications of Stewart’s comment, I do recognize the unquestionable value of popular films — in general — and Hitchcock’s films — in particular — as a curriculum tool. And I know it first hand since, in my introductory course on Spanish literature and culture, I always use Hitchcock’s films as a very effective teaching tool. For instance, what better way to teach the notion of “suspense” — no matter what the story might be — than by showing the following famous school yard sequence from The Birds (1963):

It has all the element of a great story and, better yet!, it never fails. For those of you, unrepentant Hitchcockians who happen to be teachers as well , The Guardian‘s columnist Anne Billson offers five more examples which I believe might well be worth to keep in mind for any teachable moment. Here is one pearl about the same movie mentioned above,  The Birds:

“There are 8,650 species of birds in the world today.” Yes, and if they all decide to peck your eyes out, you’re in deep shit. The Birds is a reminder that if nature ever decides to take back the planet, there’s not much we can do about it. Also provides a reminder of why one shouldn’t smoke near petrol pumps.

No doubt… pure Britannic wit!

And, yes!, I do love her conclusion, and pretty much agree with her:

Of course, by using Hitchcock as an educational tool you risk putting young people off his films for life, the same way they’re put off Shakespeare, but there’s a chance that class discussion of his storytelling techniques could result in a new generation of film-makers who know how to film an action scene without gratuitous wobblicam and incontinent editing. And if film studies could be extended to include how to watch a movie without talking or texting, then I’m all for them. [yes, me too!!]

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Eagleton’s The Event of Literature

Terry Eagleton is promoting his latest book The Event of Literature, soon to be released by Yale University Press. In a recent interview — released by Yale Books and available online: part 1 and part 2 — he says that his intention with the book is to return to pure literary theory — ”literary theory as such” he clarifies. This reminds me of his discussion on the first chapter of his famous Literary Theory: An Introduction, in which he explains how ideology can affects our ideas about art and literature. There he concludes that whatever we believe to be “literature” it is not something that exists the way “insects do,” but rather as a set of practices that are determined by “the assumptions by which certain social groups exercise and maintain power over others.” With that in mind, I wonder what he means with “literary theory as such.” Does he mean that “literary theory” exists as “insects do”?

Although the book is not out yet, there are a couple of good reviews available already. The best one, by New Statemen‘s literary critic Adam Kirsch, pretty much takes Eagleton to task for his attempt to revive Wittgenstein’s failed solution to the problem of universals. The fact that Eagleton is still struggling with this old problem is not surprising. We just need to go back to Literary Theory‘s last paragraph and find that his last words are invested precisely in explaining the possibility of nothing more but “universal values.” One big difference though is that Eagleton seems to have finally dropped his recalcitrant historicism and decided not to sit and wait for that sort of Marxist rapture — in which the material conditions of literary production would allow for the flourishing of such “universals” — but rather to actively look for a solution to the problem within the world.

The other review, by The Guardian‘s contributor Stuart Kelly, takes the book to task for another different reason — failing to “explain how things become literature.” Kelly mentions Wittgentein in passing as well but concentrates instead in explaining Eagleton’s take on the Austrian philosopher’s theory of “family resemblance” as “a way back to a ‘common sense’ notion” of literature. Much like Kirsch, Kelly isn’t impressed and concludes that “When, as a critic, [he calls] something literature, [he means] that it expands the field of what literature can be. David Foster Wallace is literature. Jonathan Franzen just tried to write a literary novel.” Something that Eagleton wouldn’t hesitate a second to label as a fruitless and whimsical “value-judgement.”

I guess we need to wait and see, of course. No matter how much one disagrees with the Irish critic’s at times dogmatic positions, reading him is always a pleasure. I’m looking forward to reading his Event for sure.

As a final remark, I should say that Eagleton seems to be burying himself in a weird dialogue with Borges. What the former seems to be looking for is much like what the latter describes in some of his stories, particularly”Funes el memorioso” (available in translation), and in some of his essays, for instance his “El idioma analítico de John Wilkins” (available in translation as well). I’m just guessing on this one but I might come back with more sometime in the future.

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Melancolía (2011)

Melancolía (Zentropa, 2011) es la más reciente aventura cinematográfica del director danés Lars von Trier. Como muchas de sus obras anteriores, esta última también ha generado una gran cantidad de crítica, mucha de ella negativa y, en ocasiones, hasta hostil (ver estos botones de muestra: 12 y, en un tono más positivo, 34). La película tiene una cinta sonora exquisita, con la obertura de la ópera Tristán e Isolda de Wagner como tema principal, así como una fotografía preciosista, con la influencia del autocromista belga Charles Corbet (prominencia del color verde y otros detalles) y de algunos pintores románticos alemanes como Caspar David Friedrich y Phillip Otto Runge (tratamiento de la luz y el color, y esos horizontes sombríos y premonitorios).

En pocas palabras, la película cuenta la historia de dos hermanas, Claire y Justine (Charlotte Gainsbourg y Kirsten Dunst, resp.), y de su relación durante los últimos días de vida sobre la Tierra, previo a la llegada de un planeta llamado “Melancolía” que se encuentra en curso de colisión con nuestro planeta. Al comienzo, Justine está sumida en un estado de sopor depresivo del que su hermana mayor, Claire, quien parece mucho más equilibrada y segura de sí mismo desde el inicio del film, trata de rescatarla sin éxito. Sin embargo, conforme la amenaza de la colisión entre los planetas es más y más cierta, Justine se sobrepone de su estado melancólico, mientras que su hermana sucumbe en él llevada por la desesperanza y lo que parece una muerte cierta e inevitable. Este desdoblamiento de papeles es sumamente interesante y, en mi opinión, uno de los temas más productivos (críticamente hablando) de la película. Por supuesto, al final — como pareciera ser siempre en todos los flims del director danés —, la Tierra y Melancolía chocan y toda forma de vida sobre nuestro planeta desaparece para siempre, incluidas las dos hermanas.

Definitivamente pesimista, la película es una combinación de melodrama psicológico con drama catastrófico de ciencia-ficción. En la presentación oficial de la película, von Trier dice que su intención era hacer un film donde se “zambullía en el romanticismo alemán”. Creo que definitivamente lo logró y, al hacerlo, creó una obra maestra que explora corrientes subterráneas de nuestra psiquis colectiva, corrientes que dejan al descubierto ciertos antígenos ideológicos que, en mi opinión, explican mucho de la crítica negativa recibida. Pero de eso hablaré en otra entrega.

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In Time (2011)

Noah Berlatsky is totally right, In Time (2011) wants to be a critique of capitalism but instead it ends up being a “searing satire of America’s utter inability to critique capitalism.” However, what Berlatsky fails to recognize is that the film succeeds precisely by failing. Although it is a collection of anti-capitalist cliches, the film became a box-office success precisely because of that. Should the director had made a more cerebral “critique,” the film would have ended up being a complete flop.

In fact, the film works out precisely because it uses standard Hollywood codes, from “movie-star hot 25-year-old corpse[s]” to “standard-issue Hollywood villains”— such as bankers with “inevitably Jewish name[s].” In that sense, In Time is far from being intellectually pretentious or ideologically bullying. To be crudely honest, the film is full of oxymora. But isn’t it an oxymoron anyway the rationale behind the system it portrays? Aren’t all justifications of our laissez faire, you-are-by-your-own Darwinian capitalist system another example of a big collection of oxymora? By definition, an oxymoron is a “locution that produces an incongruous, seemingly self-contradictory effect.” And that’s precisely what happens with late capitalism’s neo-utilitarian discourse. So, if the film is plagued by oxymora, it is so because our system is also plagued by them: unfairness is fair, inequality is—in the long run—better than equality, and, the worst of them all, the surviving of the fittest is the only chance the unfit has of surviving. And here it is where Hollywood’s standard codes work beautifully. Their effectiveness consists precisely in their ability to render meaningful that which is at the core absolutely void of meaning. Or, should I say instead, to render meaningful what should in more enlightened circumstances be by itself meaningless?

However, the core of this lack of meaning is far from being unique to our current circumstances. What In Time portrays isn’t simply one of many possible futures but one particular past we pretty much thought gone and superseded. I’m talking about the 19th Century Victorian world.

Yes, truth be told, I think that In Time has a surprisingly Victorian savor. For instance, in a clearly Benthamian gesture, Timekeeper Raymond Leon (Cillian Murphy) explains to naive Will Salas (Justin Timberlake) that his job is not to be concerned with “justice” but with that he “can measure… seconds, minutes, hours.” Leon, much as the Victorian Bethamites, is not interested in generalities (justice, equality, fairness) but in particulars—that is, things that can be translated into the language of science or, more precisely, the science of measuring time (and here we must remember Benjamin Franklin’s very important law of equivalence: Time is money). Similarly, when Will, after kidnapping Sylvia (Amanda Seyfried), asked her father (Vincent Kartheiser) to pay a ransom of a thousand years for his daughter release, and to give the “time” (money) to a charity, the banker only reaction is to look down despairingly, since he’s well aware that the “time” he is about to give away won’t be for his daughter but for them—the poor. In a sense, if he does it he would be violating one of the system’s most important injunctions: do not help the unfit. Of course, Phillip Weis never pays his daughter’s ransom. Such an act would be a terrible blow to the functioning of the system, whose health depends not on creating limitless wealth but on efficiently managing scarcity but, most importantly, it would rock his own symbolic world.

Likewise, Will Salas, the hero, is also unsurprisingly Victorian. As many Victorian heroes, Salas is not much in the business of changing the system but of giving people “hope.” Thus, at the most critical moment in the film, when Phillip Weis reminds the fugitive couple that despite all their efforts to upset the system they would never achieve anything but that—that is, upsetting the balance, maybe for a generation or two, but without ever achieving actual change—Will’s answer never challenges the basic assumption offered by Weis—that changing the system is beyond the realm of real possibilities, beyond reality itself. Instead, he offers a weak moral counterpoint: ”no one should be inmortal if even one person has to die.”

In a sense, In Time‘s greatest weakness is similar to that of Charles Dickens’, the most Victorian of all Victorian writers. About him, George Orwell once said that he was never a reformer but a moral critic. His goal never was to change society but to change “human nature.” Similarly, Andrew Niccol’s dystopia has no pretension for reform. That is why the film fails to offer a strong counter-argument against one of Weis’ main arguments—that “everyone wants to live forever.” Isn’t this same argument one of the main premises of modern-day capitalist discourse—that everyone wants to be rich? This simplistic core of egotism is what feeds the logic of the whole system—a system that can never be changed precisely because of this its most fundamental core deeply embedded in humanity’s own nature. And since the only offering made by the film is Will’s weak moral counterpoint, Weis’ ultimate presage goes on unchallenged—that nothing will ever change. Or, does it?

Nonetheless, I insist that by failing the film succeeds. Although Berlatsky is right by pointing out America’s (film industry’s) lack of imagination to offer a real critique of late capitalism, the “searing satire” is effective for bringing forward the repressed desire that such a lack engenders. The films succeeded commercially because most viewers understood that deep inside each one of them there was this abysmal gap—a desire for change, never mind how much effort and violence the system invests to keep it repressed, unconscious. And bringing this to the surface is one thing the movie achieves, despite of, or, precisely, because of its using of Hollywood’s most Hollywoodesque conventions.

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Las brujas de Macbeth I

En su libro sobre William Shakespeare, Terry Eagleton adelanta la ingeniosa tesis de que las brujas de Macbeth constituyen una suerte de célula revolucionaria cuyo objetivo no es otro que el de subvertir el orden social del antiguo reino escocés para hacerlo trizas, ponerlo de rodillas. Su arma, sin embargo, no es la brujería ni ningún poder místico o sobrenatural. En la rígida sociedad medieval en que habitan, el poder de las brujas reside en el lenguaje. En lugar de maldiciones o encantamientos, ellas lanzan acertijos, fórmulas que trasgreden la rígida configuración de signos sobre los que descansa el orden social establecido (El mal es bien, y el bien es mal...).

Como nos explica el crítico irlandés, la escocia de Macbeth era una sociedad donde la fuente más importante de estabilidad y orden residía en el lenguaje, en el uso de códigos comunicativos rígidos, cuyos signos formaban, cada uno, una unidad indivisible y estática. Era una sociedad jerarquizada, en la que la posición social, denotada por rangos y/o títulos, establecían no sólo la identidad de su poseedor sino también su capacidad de actuar como agente individual. Es por esa razón que el encuentro inicial de Macbeth con las brujas tiene tal poder destructor. Recordemos. La primera bruja lo saluda invocando su posición actual: señor de Glamis. La segunda lo hace usando lo que, aún sin saberlo, vendría a ser su nuevo estatus al final de ese día aciago: señor de Cáudor. La tercera, en cambio, simplemente le anuncia tajantemente: serás rey. Pocos minutos más tarde, un mensajero le anunciará al todavía confundido Macbeth la buena nueva de su ascenso a señor de Cáudor. En ese instante, con la confirmación de las palabras de la segunda bruja, las puertas del infierno se abren para devorar el orden social escocés. Si la segunda hechicera tenía la razón, como la tuvo la primera que habló de aquello que era conocido, entonces la tercera debe tenerla también, que habla de lo porvenir.

Eagleton explica que la manera como esto funciona tiene que ver con el hecho de que las brujas constituyen el inconsciente de la obra. Su propósito no es otro que elevar al estado consciente los deseos reprimidos de los personajes. Con el anuncio de que algún día será rey, Macbeth descubre un deseo secreto hasta ahora nunca exteriorizado, ni siquiera para sí mismo. Convertirse en señor de Cáudor es una gran ventaja para el noble escocés, pero una que está dentro del espectro de posibilidades o significantes permitidos para el noble escocés, dentro del rígido orden social del que él es sólo un peldaño medianamente importante. No así ser rey. Para serlo, Macbeth debe transgredir las reglas que gobiernan el orden social establecido. Debe suspender esas reglas y reconfigurarlas, lo que sólo es posible a través de un acto subversivo de proporciones cataclísmicas. Y eso es precsiamente lo que él hace instigado por el enigmático enunciado de la tercera bruja.

Pero lograr eso no es posible sin la ayuda de Lady Macbeth. Si Macbeth es un “team-player”, siempre dispuesto a subordinar sus deseos personales con el propósito de sostener el orden social del que es parte, Lady Macbeth es una individualista (pre-burguesa) dispuesta a transgredirlo todo con el objeto de concretar sus propios fines. En ese sentido, Macbeth pareciera representar la energía masculina que cumple una función social positiva: la de construir y preservar el status quo. Lady Macbeth, en cambio, es pura negatividad. Para Eagleton, sin embargo, el tipo de negatividad presentada por las brujas (como antagonistas de un orden social rígido y opresivo), no es del mismo tipo que la representada por Lady Macbeth. Si las brujas quieren subvertir el orden entero, Lady Macbeth apunta sólo a aquello que le subordina como mujer. Sin embargo, sus esfuerzos son inútiles; al final, sus acciones sólo sirven para reforzar el sistema mismo que la oprime.

Eagleton concluye que las acciones de Macbeth lo llevan a un callejón sin salida. El sistema de signos que él transgrede se sostiene precisamente sobre un signo muy particular: el del rey. Como significante maestro (para usar la expresión de Lacan), el rey simboliza la materialidad misma del sistema de signos (“el cuerpo político”) que Macbeth ha decidido transgredir. Al matar al rey Duncan, él mismo debilita y desarticula el mismo signo que el quiera encarnar. El cuerpo político que representa al rey queda así desmembrado, desmaterializado, y el nuevo rey Macbeth termina debilitado y dividido por sus propias acciones. Al final, el nuevo rey se convierte en un manojo de significantes inconexos y desarticulados; su cuerpo en una piltrafa dispuesta sólo para la batalla. Y aquí está la ironía. La función transgresora de las brujas no sólo atenta contra el orden social del reino escocés, contra sus rígidas relaciones simbólicas, sino contra cualquier tipo de orden social. Por eso, al final de la pieza, como el mismo Eagleton reconocerá más tarde en su libro Sobre el mal, el proceso homicida que ellas inician no da como resultado nada que pueda celebrarse. Su único logro es carecer de algún logro (being pointless). El tipo de satisfacción que ellas proveen, el tipo de deseo que las mueve y que ellas siembran por doquier, es el lacaniano goce obsceno. Y su modus operandi radica, precisamente, en hacer todo lo posible — sin importar el costo propio en que se incurra — para que el otro no se beneficie, no disfrute del objeto deseado.

 

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